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CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CAUSES
Joseph Cripe
When the defendant in a criminal case takes the witness
stand, his general moral character may be attacked for the pur-
pose of affecting his credibility. Section 2272 of Burns' Stat-
utes, 1926 Revision, provides that: "In all questions affecting
the credibility of a witness, his general moral character may be
given in evidence." This originally was Section 1803 of the
Revised Statutes of 1881, and has been in force ever since the
19th of September, 1881. It must be understood that the char-
acter of the accused in a criminal case is not in issue unless he
chooses to bring it into question by himself first offering evi-
dence in support of his good character but it has become the
rule ever since Fletcher v State,' that if he avails himself of the
privilege of testifying, he testifies under the same rules and
may be impeached in the same manner as other witnesses.2
If the defendant in a criminal cause has testified, the State
may, if such evidence is available, prove that the general moral
reputation of the defendant is bad. It is competent for the State
to impeach him in the same manner in which it might impeach
any other witness. The statute is probably intended to be cumu-
lative and does not take away the right of a party seeking to
impeach a witness to prove his general character for truth and
veracity. Robinson v. State.3
Moral character can be shown only by proof of the general
reputation of the accused and cannot be shown by proof of
specific acts of immorality.4
When the defendant in a criminal prosecution introduces
evidence of his good character as a defense, the evidence should
be limited to that particular trait of character that is relevant
to the crime charged. The word "character" as used above was
used in the sense of reputation and under the provision of
Burns' 1926 Statutes, Section 2272, the reputed general moral
character of a witness may be shown without being confined to
his general reputation for truth and veracity.
149 Ind. 124.
2 Mershon v. State, 51 Ind. 14.
3 84 Ind. 452 at 455.
4 Griffith ,v. State, 140 Ind. 163 at 166. Drew v. State, 124 Ind. 9 at 13.
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General character is shown by general reputation and not by
specific acts of one's life but the general reputation must be con-
fined to the particular traits of character that are supposed to
render to some extent the commission of the crime charged im-
probable. When evidence is admitted touching the general
character of a party, it ought to bear reference to the nature
of the charge against him, for instance; if he is accused of theft
-that he is reputed to be an honest man or if accused of treason
-a man of loyalty.
On a charge of stealing, it would be irrelevant and absurd to
inquire into the prisoner's loyalty or humanity; on a charge
of high treason, it would be equally absurd to inquire into his
honesty and punctuality in private dealings. Such evidence re-
lates to principles of moral conduct which however much they
might operate on other occasions would not be likely to operate
on that which is alone the subject of inquiry. It would not
afford the least presumption that the prisoner might not have
been tempted to commit the crime for which he is tried and is
therefore totally inapplicable to the point in question. 5
In Walker v. State,6 the defendant was prosecuted and con-
victed of murder. At the close of the testimony offered by the
defense, the accused attempted to prove that his general moral
character was good. This evidence was excluded and on appeal,
the Supreme Court held that the evidence that the previous
character of the appellant for peace and quietude was good
would have been admissible but that the previous moral char-
acter of the appellant was not a proper subject of inquiry. It
will be noticed that the State had not attacked the character
of the defendant as a witness. It is settled law in Indiana that
a party charged with crime who undertakes to introduce evi-
dence of his character must confine that evidence to the par-
ticular trait of character involved in the charge against him.7
As a general rule, it is the character of the living and not the
deceased nor the person on whom the crime was committed that
is in issue and as to which, therefore, evidence is admissible
but where the question arises whether the accused acted upon
grounds that justify him in the deed, the character of the de-
ceased might be the circumstance to be taken into consideration,
especially might this be the case where the accused knew that
5 State v. Bloom, 68 Ind. 54.
6 102 Ind. 502.
7 Kahlenbeck v. State, 119 Ind. 118 at 121.
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character and also knew at the time the individual by whom
the attack upon him or his property was made.
In a homicide case or in a case of like nature, if the deceased
was in the habit of becoming intoxicated and when in that con-
dition was quarrelsome and violent and that fact was known to
the defendant and if it is further claimed that the deceased
was intoxicated at the time of the clash between him and the
defendant and that the defendant's conduct on that occasion
is claimed to have been influenced by a knowledge of the alleged
violent habits of the deceased when so intoxicated, the question
of such habits or disposition would seem to be one of fact rather
than of general character.
Whenever it is shown that a person is himself attacked, it is
admissible for him to put in evidence whatever would show such
attack to be felonious. He may introduce proof that the person
assailing him had with him burglar's instruments; he may prove
him to have been armed with deadly weapons; he may prove him
to have been lurking in the neighborhood on other plans of
violence. He is entitled to reason with himself in this way:
"This man comes to my house masked or with his face blacked.
He is the same one who has been prowling about in the neigh-
borhood and is connected with other felonious plans. I believe
that such is his object now," and if so, he is also entitled to say,
"This man now attacking me is a notorious ruffian. He has no
peaceful business with me. His character and relations forbid
any other conclusion than that his present attack is felonious,"
and if such could be a legitimate reason for him to expect and
defend himself against a desperate conflict, the facts are such
that he is entitled to avail himself of them on trial.8
Not even the defendant in a murder case or cases of like
nature may bring forward in evidence the bad character of the
deceased in general where he does not particularize the trait
or prove an evil trait not related to the special matter of the
defense. He cannot show the trait until a foundation for it is
laid in the contentions and other proofs of the case but where
the foundation is laid, as that he acted in self-defense, he may
then give evidence of a generally known evil trait of a sort
which might properly influence his conduct, as, that the attack-
ing person was in character quarrelsome and dangerous. On
the other hand where the defendant made the attack as appears
on the direct proofs and he persisted in the quarrel, evidence
of the quarrelsome character of the deceased is not admissible.
8 Boyle v. State, 97 Ind. 322 at 324.
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One has no greater right to attack or kill a quarrelsome person
than a peaceful one but in self-defense a man set upon may
adapt his measures to the seeming danger which increases with
the dangerous character of the assailant. 9
If no attack is made on the character of the defendant and
he has not put the same in issue in any particular, it is pre-
sumed to be good but he is not entitled to have the jury so in-
structed. His character is not taken into consideration unless
the defendant first introduces evidence in support of it. In that
event, the question of character has to be decided upon the evi-
dence in the same manner as any other question in the cause and
the Court will not instruct the jury in an assault and battery
case that the character of the defendant for peace and quietude
is presumed to be good until the contrary is shown.'0
Evidence as to character must relate to the general character
and must be confined to those peculiar traits which make it
improbable that defendant would commit the crime charged,
and must be directed to his reputation or character among those
with whom he, and not the witness, associates. The moral
character of defendant, or whether he is a grave man or a
coward, is not a proper subject of inquiry.
It is not always necessary to establish character by proof of
reputation in the community. It may be shown by the testi-
mony of those who know the accused; but a witness as to the
character of defendant must have some personal knowledge of
the fact to render him competent to testify with respect thereto.
It maybe shown by negative testimony, but cannot be estab-
lished by proof of particular facts and circumstances; and a
witness who testifies to his quiet and peaceable character should
not be permitted to state what his disposition was when crossed
or abused. Evidence of character at a period remote from the
date of the crime may properly be excluded. Where a person is
accused of murder by firearms, evidence of his familiarity with
the use of firearms is admissible. Where a conspiracy is charged
defendant cannot show the good character of his co-defendants.
If defendant refuses to put his general character in issue, he
will not be permitted to prove by his jailer what his character
was while confined in prison."
The state should not be permitted to introduce evidence of the
bad character of defendant, where he has not made his charac-
9 0sburn v. State, 164 Ind. 262 at 272.
10 Knight v. State, 70 Ind. 375 at 380.
1121 Cyc. 906; 29 S. E. 153.
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ter an issue, nor may it show that he lived expensively or had
not occupation or means. However, it is not improper for the
state to show what defendant's business was or where he lived.
But when defendant introduces evidence of his good character
the state may oppose it by proof that his previous character
was bad. However, state witnesses will not be permitted to give
testimony of such bad character based on what they heard after
the homicide. While the state cannot, primarily or in rebuttal,
offer evidence of specific acts of defendant involving the trait
of character evidenced by the crime charged, it may on cross-
examination properly test the credibility or information of a
witness testifying to defendant's good character by inquiry
as to his knowledge of particular acts of defendant involving
such trait. If such examination results in proof that defendant
has been prosecuted for a disturbance of the peace, he cannot
be permitted to meet it by showing the details of his arrest and
the offense.
The general rule excluding evidence of the character of the
deceased applies with equal force against the state and defend-
ant. The state will not be permitted to offer primary evidence
of the character of the deceased for morals, or for peace and
quietude, although defendant offers evidence of his own good
reputation. But where defendant attempts to show that de-
ceased was a violent and dangerous man the state may properly
offer proof of his peaceable and law-abiding character, although
defendant does not attack the general reputation of deceased
for peaceableness and good disposition. The evidence offered
by the state should be confined to the question of deceased's
character for peaceableness. His general moral character or
piety are not material to the issue. If the accused undertakes
to justify the homicide on the ground of threats made by de-
ceased, the state may prove that the general character of de-
ceased was that of an inoffensive man, and one not reasonably
to be expected to execute the threats. When it is admitted that
deceased was sitting down when shot, testimony as to the habit
of deceased of sitting down when conversing is not prejudicial.
Evidence that the deceased who died from a pistol wound, was
an expert with a pistol, is immaterial. Evidence as to where
deceased lived, with whom he lived, and his family relations is
admissible.
In Robinson v. State,12 the Court there held that the statute
which provided that in all questions affecting the credibility of
32 84 Ind. 452.
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a witness, his general moral character may be given in evidence,
Statutes 1881, Sec. 1803, which became operative on Septem-
ber 19, 1881, should apply to criminal cases as well as civil ones
and further decided that the law was not an ex post facto law,
the Court saying, "So far as mere modes of procedure are con-
cerned, a party has no more right in a criminal than in a civil
action to insist that his case shall be disposed of under the law
in force when the act to be investigated is charged to have
taken place. Remedies must always be under the control of the
legislature and it would create endless confusion in legal pro-
ceedings if every case was to be conducted only in accordance
with the rules of practice and heard only by the Courts in ex-
istence when those facts arose. The legislature may abolish
Courts and create new ones, and it may prescribe altogether dif-
ferent modes of procedure in its discretion though it cannot
lawfully dispense with any of those substantial protections with
which the existing law surrounds the person accused of crime.
Stewart v. State,13 is a very short case and sets out the law
fully and clearly as to the rights of the State and the defendant
in introducing character evidence. The Court in that case says,
"It is a well recognized legal principle that the character and
reputation of a defendant on trial for murder for peace and
quietude is not in issue and cannot be attacked by the State in
the first instance. Such reputation is in issue only when the
defendant himself puts it in by offering evidence of his good
character in that respect." The Court further held that if evi-
dence was erroneously admitted at the instance of the State as
to the defendant's bad character, the error would not be cured
by the introduction of evidence by the defendant to show his
good character for the trait upon which the State had made
its attack.
Mere contradiction among witnesses examined in Court sup-
plies no ground for admitting evidence of general character.
If, in the multiplicity of contradictions daily occurring, each
witness was permitted to bring in other witnesses to sustain his
general character and they contradicting each other should be
permitted to bring in others and so on, the whole time of our
Courts would be taken up in hearing these side questions until
the matters originally in litigation would be lost sight of to
the great detriment of litigants.14
13 184 Ind. 367.
14 Pruett V. Cox, 21 Ind. 15 at 16.
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The party producing a witness shall not be allowed to impeach
his claim by evidence of bad character unless it was indispensa-
ble that the party should produce him or in case of manifest
surprise when the party shall have this right. This statute is
but the enactment of the common law rule.15
In Presser v. State,16 testimony to prove the good character
of a witness whose testimony had been contradicted by other
witnesses was refused. The Court held that it was well settled
law that a witness who is contradicted by evidence disproving
the matters of fact testified to by him could not call witnesses to
prove good character. A witness whose general character has
not been impeached and whose testimony has only been con-
tradicted by other witnesses cannot introduce witnesses to prove
his general moral character and the introduction of such tes-
timony is good cause for reversing the judgment. Such testi-
mony not only tends unnecessarily to extend the raising and
investigating of collateral issues but it tends to give additional
weight and undue influence to the testimony of such witnesses
whose characters have been proven to be good over and above
the same testimony by the same witnesses under the legal pre-
sumption of good character. 7
The law presumes the general character of a witness to be
good until it shall be impeached. 18
In the impeachment of a witness, the subject of the inquiry,
whether upon the examination in chief or the cross-examina-
tion is his general moral character and where an impeaching
witness has testified in chief that as to one of the elements of
moral character, the reputation of a party sought to be im-
peached is good, it is within the discretion of a trial court to
allow such witness to be cross-examined in regard to the party's
reputation as to any other or all of the essential and constitu-
ent elements of good moral character. 9
If a reputation witness on cross-examination names the per-
son or persons whom he heard say that the defendant's reputa-
tion in a certain particular was bad, it is generally believed that
the person named may be called to testify in denial of what the
witness quoted him as saying. This belief is erroneous. In
other words if A Says that B is a thief and is reputed to be dis-
15 Diffenderfer v. Scott, 5 Ind. App. 243 at 247.
16 77 Ind. 274.
17Brann v. Campbell, 86 Ind. 516 at 517; Johnson v. State, 21 Ind. 329.
18 Fitzgerald v. Goff, 99 Ind. 28 at 33 and 34.
19 Wachstetter v. State, 99 Ind. 290.
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honest and that C told the witness that B was dishonest, C
will not be permitted to testify in denial of what A said. Where
the impeaching witness on direct examination states that the
general reputation for truth and veracity as well as the general
moral character of one of defendant's witnesses is bad and
upon cross-examination by the defendant names the persons
who have spoken disparagingly of the impeached witness, the
defendant will not be permitted to call such persons in order to
contradict the impeaching witness. 20
One who testifies to the good reputation of another may on
cross-examination be asked whether he has heard about other
crimes of the defendant.21
It is only after an effort has been made to impeach a witness
that he may then introduce evidence in support of his reputation
on the particular trait of character involved in the attack made
by the opposing party. Johnson v. State, 21 Ind. 329.
The reputation of a place cannot be proved in the first in-
stance by the State unless such evidence is made admissible by
statute.22 The acts of 1926, Chap. 48, Sec. 28, Page 156, makes
such evidence admissible in the prosecution of a defendant for
maintaining a nuisance under the intoxicating liquor law of
Indiana.
There are some exceptions to the above rule. In a prosecu-
tion under Sec. 2562 of Burns' 1926 Statutes for keeping a
house of ill fame, the courts have held that the term "ill fame"
itself opened the way for the introduction of such evidence. So
too, evidence in the first instance is admissible upon the part
of the state in a prosecution where the defendant is charged
with keeping a gaming house. Betts v. State,23 is a very well
reasoned case though it is not in entire accord with some of the
cases from other Courts. See also Christison v. State.2 4
In the case of Robinson v. State,25 evidence in the trial Court
was offered and admitted in the first instance to show that the
defendant who was charged with violating the intoxicating
liquor law of Indiana was known and reputed to be a bootlegger.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, that Court held in an opinion
written by Chief Justice Ewbank that evidence of that nature
2oRobbins v. Spencer, 121 Ind. 594.
21 Shears v. State, 147 Ind. 51 at 56.
22 Schacklett v. State, 145 N. E. 554.
23 93 Ind. 375.
24 177 Ind. 363.
25 149 N. E. 891.
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would not affect the credibility of the defendant who was a wit-
ness in his own behalf and that it was error to admit such tes-
timony.
Upon the theory that the declarant of a dying declaration
stands on the same footing as any other witness called into
Court and examined, it is held that dying declarations may be
impeached by showing -the bad character and reputation of the
deceased either generally or for truth and veracity.26
In the Michigan Law Review for May, 1926, the following
statement appeared: "In an action for malicious prosecution, the
witness was allowed to testify that so far as he knew, the repu-
tation of the plaintiff was good. On cross-examination, he te -
tified that he had never heard anything for or against the plain-
tiff. Held, error to admit the testimony as evidence of good
reputation, the court saying 'reputation of a man, which the
law admits as evidence is the common report which others make
about him, the talk about him, which shows the opinion in
which he is held in the community * * * and if the
witness offered has not heard the person discussed or spoken
of, he cannot testify to his reputation.' 27
The question is thus clearly raised: is the fact that one's
character is not discussed evidence that his reputation is good?
In Commonwealth v. Rogers, 136 Mass. 158, cited in the prin-
cipal case, the witness who had testified he had heard the party's
reputation discussed only twice, was held incompetent to tes-
tify to his general reputation. To similar effect, Commonwealth
v. Lawler.28 (The witness in latter case was called to impeach
and not sustain the principal.) The notion apparently was,
as the court in Walker v. Moors,29 said, that general reputation
is a fact 'and what establishes it is that the subject has been so
discussed and considered that there is in the public mind a uni-
form and concurrent sentiment that can be stated as a fact.'
The conclusion the courts draw from this doctrine is that one
who has not heard these reports is not qualified to testify to
reputation. It is submitted, however, that general reputation
which a party has may be proved to be good by the fact that a
witness, otherwise qualified to testify, has never heard anything
26 Wharton on Homicide, 3rd Edition, p. 1039.
27 Clark v. Eastern Mass. St. Ry. Co., (Mass. 1926) 150 N. E. 184.
28 12 Allen (Mass.) 585.
29122 Mass. 501.
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against the principal. 30 In Lenox v. Fuller,31 the witness' testi-
mony that he had never heard defendant's reputation ques-
tioned, was held admissible as evidence of good reputation. The
court said, 'The fact that a person's truthfulness has never been
the subject of controversy is, according to general observation
and experience, very cogent evidence to prove him worthy of
credit, and when those who would be likely to know if it had
been the subject of criticism, testify they have no knowledge
that it has been criticised, the evidence is proper as conducive
to the effect that such person could not have borne the bad
reputation imputed.' The court, in addition, reaffirmed the doc-
trine that absence of such criticism is not evidence of bad repu-
tation. In People v. Davi, 32 the witness had never heard the
principal's reputation questioned, although he had known the
principal for many years, and yet it was held that his testi-
mony was evidence of the principal's good reputation. The
court said that by a contrary rule 'the most respectable man
in the community might fail at being supported if his charac-
ter was attacked, for living all his life above suspicion, his truth
would rarely be the subject of remarks.' It is, therefore, sub-
mitted that in the light of authority and reason opposing the
principal case, the testimony of a witness, otherwise competent,
that he has never heard the principal's character discussed is
evidence of good reputation, on the theory that bad news travels
faster than good news, a theory based on common observation
of life and human nature, which justifies its being incorporated
into the rules of evidence.33 The Courts of Indiana are in ac-
cord with this last view. 34
It is believed that much of the confusion and uncertainty
arising over the effort to introduce character evidence will van-
ish if it is borne in mind that there is a great and well founded
difference between the defendant as a defendant and the de-
fendant in his status as a witness.
30 3 Wigmore on Evidence, 2d ed. sec. 1614.
21 39 Mich. 268, 272.
32 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 309.
33 See Michigan Law Review, May 1926, Pages 722-723.
*34 68 Ind. 238; 132 Ind. 254.
